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awards are merely advisory until1 79confirmation, interest probably
would not run until confirmation.
In Matter of Kavares v. MVAIC, 18 0 the appellate division,
first department, held that the determination of an MVAIC
award is not merely advisory, but binding on the parties, and
absent fraud or statutory wrongdoing must be confirmed if application is made by a party within one year.' 8
The court
reasoned that since such awards were final and definite, they
would come within the purview of CPLR 5002.182
The practitioner should thus be able to obtain compensation
for his client for any delay between the time of award and
confirmation.
CPLR 5015(a):

Court may vacate a judgment it has rendered.

According to CPLR 5015 (a) a court which rendered a
judgment may relieve a party from it in the interests of justice.
A court may, thus, reverse its judgment where, for example,
there was an excusable default or where evidence,
discovered
88
after a trial, makes the result of that trial unjust.
In Brenner v. Arterial Plaz , Inc.,14 plaintiff obtained a
default judgment in New York County, and subsequently filed a
transcript of it in Fulton County. Defendant moved to have the
default vacated, laying the venue of the motion in Saratoga
County and asserting the filing in Fulton County as jurisdictional
grounds for the motion. In reversing an order which set aside
the verdict, the appellate division, third department, cited the
provisions of the CPLR requiring that a motion on notice be
heard where the action is triable, 85 i.e., "after entry of judgment,
the place where the judgment was entered."'18 The court observed
that while a judgment may be docketed many times it 87is entered
only once, i.e., where the action proceeded to judgmentY.

"7 See
5 WINSTIN, Kom & MT.Lml, NWv YoRK Civil, PRAcricE
15002.04 (1965).
18029 App. Div. 2d 68, 285 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1st Dep't 1967).
is'CPLR 7510. See also Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97 (1902) for the
grounds upon which an arbitration award will be set aside.
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

It is obvious that while a court maintains discretionary power
to vacate a judgment, 8s that judgment must be its own and
not merely one which was docketed in the county where the
court sits.
ARTICLE 52CPLR 5201:

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

Court of Appeals holds Seider v. Roth
constitutional.

In Simpson v. Loehmann,8 9 decided in late December, the
Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Seider v. Roth. 90
Thus, the Seider holding, which allows the attachment of a
liability insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify to become
the basis of in rem jurisdiction, was reaffirmed.
Subsequently, in February, the Southern District of New
York, in Podolsky v. DeVinney,"'9 held that Seider was unconstitutional. The court reasoned from the premise that CPLR
320(c) denies a defendant a limited appearance. Thus, it was
recognized that, in order to litigate on the merits, a, "Seider"
defendant is forced into a jurisdiction that has infinitesimal contacts
with the action, and subjected to personal liability beyond the
insurance policy's limits.
In the most recent "Seider" development, the Court of
Appeals, in denying a motion to reargue Simpson,9 2 has indicated that a "Seider" defendant, in spite of 320(c), will be
allowed a limited appearance to the extent of the face value of
the insurance policy attached. Thus, a good deal of the constitutional objection raised by Podolsky has been undercut, and
the Court of Appeals appears to be adhering to its much criticized
decision in Seider.
CPLR 5201:

"Seider" action dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds.

In Vaage v. Lewis, 19 3 plaintiff commenced a personal injury
94
action pursuant to the procedure authorized by Seider v. Roth,'
188 5 WEiNsmn,
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N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).

For a

background discussion see Note, Seider v. Roth: The Conwtitutionaw Phase,
43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 58 (1968).
'go 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
113,281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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